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Abstract. Two main results in the area of information hiding in natural
language text are presented. A semantically-based scheme dramatically
improves the information-hiding capacity of any text through two tech-
niques: (i) modifying the granularity of meaning of individual sentences,
whereas our own previous scheme kept the granularity fixed, and (ii)
halving the number of sentences affected by the watermark. No longer a
￿long text, short watermark￿ approach, it now makes it possible to wa-
termark short texts, like wire agency reports. Using both the above-
mentioned semantic marking scheme and our previous syntactically-
based method hides information in a way that reveals any non-trivial
tampering with the text (while re-formatting is not considered to be
tampering￿the problem would be solved trivially otherwise by hiding a
hash of the text) with a probability 1￿2
￿β(n+1), n being its number of
sentences and  β a small positive integer based on the extent of co-
referencing.
1  Introduction
This paper reports a significant development in digital natural language (NL) text
watermarking. It continues in the direction established in [1] in that it also:
•  operates with the text per se rather than its printed or displayed image;
•  embeds the watermark in the underlying structure of the text rather than in the
surface elements of the text, such as words (cf. [2]);
•  manipulates the text with the help of a small number of well-defined transforma-
tions (although, as mentioned, a transformation may now substantially modify the
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meaning of a sentence while preserving the meaning of the overall text and￿un-
like in our previous scheme￿each transformation now has multiple ways in
which it can be used to modify a given sentence, thus resulting in a much higher
information-hiding capacity for a given text);
•  does it all with the one secret  key.
It improves that scheme considerably, however, by dramatically expanding the band-
width and thus relieving the method of the long-text limitation.
While [1] established the basic technique for embedding a resilient watermark in
NL text by combining a number of information assurance and security (IAS) tech-
niques with the advanced methods and resources of natural language processing
(NLP), it also faced the limitation of a narrow bandwidth: it was best applicable to
long texts because it assured the embedding of just one bit of the watermark bitstring
in each sentence and required a marker sentence for each watermark-bearing sentence,
thus effectively lowering the bandwidth to .5 bit per sentence. And because both the
resilience and low probability of false positives depended on a small ratio of the num-
ber of markers plus the number of watermark-bearing sentences to the total number of
sentences, the longer the text the better were the results. The reason for the narrow
bandwidth in [1] is that it manipulates the syntactic trees representing the syntactic
structures of the text sentences: such trees are not very large, and the possibilities for
transforming them so that they embed the necessary portion of the watermark bitstring
are limited.
This paper uses the same algorithm on text-meaning representations (TMRs) of the
text sentences, which are much larger and richer trees that, like the syntactic trees, are
automatically generated by the analyzer (see [3], Section 6.2, for a detailed and acces-
sible example of TMR production) and that allow multiple semantic transformations
of a large number of elements in them. This allows us to raise the bandwidth to around
8 bits per typical watermark-bearing sentence, although in practice we use 4 bits per
sentence and reserve one for a special usage. It also allows, if needed, dispensing with
marker sentences, thus enabling the technique to deal with such short texts as wire
agency reports. And because the meaning of the text remains essentially the same, the
current technique watermarks a text as well as many possible paraphrases of it, in-
cluding its translations to any other NL.
This paper also describes how the semantic marking scheme presented in this pa-
per, as well as the syntactic one in [1], can be used together to design a system that
tamperproofs text; here we (mis)use ￿tamperproofing￿ in the sense of ￿making tam-
per-evident,￿ i.e., any tampering with the text can be detected from the (corrupted)
text itself, without the use of any other outside information. The probability that tam-
pering with a sentence goes undetected is 2
￿βn+1) (where n is the number of sentences
in the text and β is the number of watermark bits per watermark-bearing sentence).
The scheme uses, in two separate passes, both the semantic watermarking approach
and the syntactic one (that leaves the TMR unchanged), thus overcoming circularity
and exposure to the last sentence. In the first pass over the text, the semantic approach
is used (which also modifies the syntactic trees). The second pass needs to perform
something similar to the first pass but in a reverse order of the sentences, and has to
also ￿respect￿ (i.e., not undo) what the first pass did: This is precisely what the syn-198      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
tactic pass does (works with syntactic trees without modifying the TMRs). Note that
we cannot do it the other way around, because the semantic approach modifies both
TMRs and syntax and, if used as the second pass, would undo what the first pass did.
All this will be made more precise later in the paper, but for now we should stress that
here we do not consider minor re-formatting of the text (like changing the line breaks
or the spaces to be tampering, otherwise the problem of tamperproofing text would be
trivial (￿store the keyed hash of the text in the formatting information￿). Not surpris-
ingly, our tamperproofing scheme works equally well for short texts as for long ones
(contrast this with the fact that our watermarking scheme still favors longer texts, in
the sense that the watermark for them is more resilient than for short texts).
2  State of the Art
NL watermarking, at least as practiced here, abides by the same principles as image
watermarking: The watermark should be resilient, undetectable to anybody but the
author/owner of the text, easily and fully automatically produced by the dedicated
software, etc. The crucial difference, making NL watermarking more difficult, is that
￿[u]nlike noisy data [in the images], written text contains less redundant information
which could be used for secret communication￿ [4: 36], such as in steganography or
watermarking. Naturally, the first attempts in text watermarking tried to treat text as
image [5-7] or to manipulate the external formatting properties and parameters of
LaTeX, HTML, or PostScript [4: 36-37].
Attempting to embed watermarks in texts themselves, various groups have deliber-
ately inserted spelling, syntactic, punctuation or even content errors. Synonym substi-
tution has never lost its appeal (cf. [2]), but none of these methods prove to be very
resilient, and they do degrade the quality of the text (an inessential deliberate distor-
tion in the data may gain significance under special circumstances). Another technique
that has been tried in text watermarking mimics, statistically or syntactically but never
semantically, the properties of a NL text and generates a cover text around a secret
message that may look like a regular text to a computer but never to a human, because
it is, basically, meaningless￿at least at the paragraph, if not the sentence level (see,
for instance, [8-10]).
[1] is the first approach to aspire to the same principles and requirements as the
best work in image watermarking while preserving the meaning and the quality of the
text. The basic premises of this approach are shared by this paper. It should be noted
that the approach follows the now pretty standard method of dividing the bits of the
watermark￿s (hashed) bitstring among the text sentences, first introduced apparently in
the work of Anderson and Petitcolas [11, 12].
3  Basic Premises
In this section we briefly review the framework and the basic elements of the scheme
introduced in [1]. This is in preparation for the main novel ideas in the paper, which
are contained in sections 4 to 6.Natural Language Watermarking and Tamperproofing      199
Watermarked Text: Watermark W is inserted in text T, resulting in text T￿, which pre-
serves the meaning of T. W is not readable from T￿ without knowledge of the secret
key used to introduce W. With the secret key, one does not need T to produce W from
T￿. Without the key, it is very hard to remove W from T￿ without drastically changing
its meaning and thus destroying the identity of the text. Only the key is secret while
the process of introducing W into T is not.
Adversary: Interested in removing, destroying, or at least damaging W without de-
stroying the identity of T, the adversary will perform meaning-preserving transforma-
tions on the text, well beyond reformatting and other appearance-related tinkering,
which he is actually allowed to do, including inter-language translation; perform
meaning-modifying transformations on a small number of sentences (a large number
of such transformation will modify the overall meaning and identity of the text); insert
new sentences, move sentences and blocks of sentences around. While the adversary
knows what our scheme does he does not know where in the text it has been applied,
and, of course, no amount of paraphrasing, including sentence and paragraph substitu-
tion, will remove the watermark.
Building Blocks: We use k to denote the (secret) watermark-insertion key, which is
also used at watermark-reading time. The first building block we need is a facility for
using k to read a number (say, β) of secret bits that are in a sentence s (this is what the
sentence ￿secretly says￿ to someone who knows k). If the watermark W￿s length w is
longer than β then it will be stored in α = w / β selected sentences. The way to select
these sentences using k is the third building block, described last in this section. The
second building block we describe explains how a particular selected sentence can be
modified until it secretly says the right thing, where ￿the right thing￿ means that the β
bits it secretly says equal the portion of the watermark that this sentence is supposed to
store. The reading of what a sentence secretly says can be done in any of a number of
ways. We describe some below, beginning with one that has drawbacks but that will
serve as an introduction for the later (better) one. Let Hk(s) be a keyed function of s
when s is viewed as a bitstring (by reading the characters that make up s and recording
the binary representation of each character); for the sake of definiteness, we assume
Hk(s) is a keyed hash of s. The β bits secretly hidden within s are the leftmost β bits of
Hk(s) (or, alternatively, its rightmost β bits, or its middle β bits￿any consistent choice
will do). One drawback of this scheme is that the slightest change to s (e.g., synonym
substitution, replacing one article by an equivalent one) is likely to destroy the water-
mark bits in it, i.e., make it say something that no longer equals the portion of the
watermark that the sentence is supposed to store. This drawback is remedied in the
next technique. Let T(s) be the tree structure that represents either the syntactic struc-
ture of s (in the syntactic version of our scheme), or the meaning of s (in the semantic
version of our scheme, in which case the tree is the ￿text meaning representation,￿ aka
TMR tree). (See the demo site for examples of T(s) in each case.) We use β bits of
Hk(s) to store the watermark, i.e., it is β bits of Hk(s) (not of H(s)) that the sentence s
￿secretly says.￿ Using Hk(T(s)) rather than Hk(s) has the advantage that minor modifi-
cations to s leave T(s) unchanged, hence s more resiliently retains the β watermark bits
in it, when subjected to simple modifications to s (for example, synonym substitutions
do not change T(s) when that tree￿s representation captures the details of its branching200      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
structure but ignores the specific contents of individual nodes). If a selected sentence
does not secretly say the bits we need it to say, we attempt to make it say the correct
bit sequence by transforming the sentence without any serious meaning change to the
overall text. The approach is to cause a change in T(s) and recalculate what the modi-
fied sentence secretly says, until it ends up secretly saying the desired β bits. The
syntactic transformations are described in detail in [1]; the semantic ones are intro-
duced in the next section.
Our scheme makes use of the notion of a secret ranking of the n sentences to de-
termine which sentences will carry watermark bits. Let the text to be watermarked
consist of n sentences s1 , ￿ , sn. For each such tree Ti we obtain a binary string Bi,
and the secret ranking of the sentences is that of the lexicographic ordering of their
Bi￿s (with ties broken according to the sentence￿s position in the original text). There
are many ways in which such a Bi can be obtained from the tree Ti. One example is Bi
= Hk(Ti) where Ti is a representation of the tree Ti. (There are many possible ways to
represent a tree Ti, including using a listing of the pre-order numbers of the tree￿s
nodes according to a post-order traversal of the tree, or an ￿adjacency lists￿ represen-
tation￿for each node use a list containing the node￿s children, etc.) The smallest-
ranked α = n / β sentences (in the secret ranking) are markers and it is the sentences
that follow the markers that are watermark-carrying. (Actually there could be slightly
more than α markers￿see [1].) Why, though, not use the markers themselves (instead
of their successors in the text) for storing the watermark? Because the modifications,
needed to insert watermark bits in what a sentence secretly says, would change that
sentence￿s Bi and hence its secret ranking (that sentence would then almost surely no
longer be a marker, and even if it remained one it would be in the wrong secret order
relative to the other markers). One way of avoiding markers is described later in the
paper.
Validation and Evaluation: We will, obviously, feel more confident about the propos-
als after we run the systems on a large number of texts. So far, the proof-of-concept
system has run well on a small number of texts, as per the demo (see fn. 1), and the
system time has been 3-8 msec per transformation performed. A test watermark has
been inserted successfully in texts ranging from 12-36 sentences resulting in 3-6 trans-
formations per text. These data should be considered very preliminary as we are plan-
ning a massive evaluation, validation, and improvement of the schemata within a
much larger research frame.
4  TMR Trees and Semantic Transformations
4.1  Arborization
For our watermarking scheme, we use a tree built out of the TMRs provided by onto-
logical semantics and obtained fully automatically in the analysis of the sentences of a
text. The TMR is a list of propositions describing the events and concepts that repre-
sent the meaning of a text. For the purpose of generation of sentences and other issues
we have to interface with the main ontological semantic application. This means thatNatural Language Watermarking and Tamperproofing      201
we need a reversible method of translation between the TMR proposition lists and our
TMR trees. Such a method is described in this section.
For the building of TMR trees, the ￿arborization￿ if you will, we take the proposi-
tions as material and a small set of principles, many of which are already explicitly
realized in the TMR, as tools. Generally, one such tree represents one sentence. A
prominent exception is the co-reference list, a separate tree that establishes the identity
of concepts throughout a text and will require special attention.
The main principles for turning a set of TMR proposition into a tree are:
1.  The event proposition of the (often implicit) speech act of every sentence is
the root of its TMR tree.
2.  Filled slots of a concept are suspended from it as branches.
These simple principles cover most of the arborization issues, as in this straightfor-
ward example, slightly abbreviated ￿as indicated by elements in quotation marks￿to
save horizontal space:
(1)  The EU ministers will tax aviation fuel as a way of curbing the environmental
impact of air travel.
author-event-1--|--author--unknown
                         |--theme--levy-tax-1--|--agent--set-4--|--member-type--geopolitical-entity
                                                           |                         |--cardinality--unknown
                                                           |                         |--members--(set| ￿EU nations￿)
                                                           |--theme--kerosene-1
                                                           |--purpose--regulate-1--|--agent--unknown-1
                                                                                                |--theme--effect-1--|--caused-by--flight
In case two or more propositions of one sentence share a concept, we have decided
to suspend the second and later propositions from the first one. In the following exam-
ple, the theme of the goods for which the manufacturing capacity is expected to be
expanded are the same as would otherwise have to be imported. Hence, in the TMR
propositions the themes of the concepts representing the expansion manufacturing
event, MANUFACTURE-1, and the import event, IMPORT-1, are identical (see a detailed
explanation of how this particular TMR is produced automatically in [3], Section 6.2).
(2) Dresser Industries said it expects that major capital expenditure for expan-
sion of U.S. manufacturing capacity will reduce imports from Japan.
In TMR proposition lists the co-reference is represented as a separate parameter at the
end of the list:
(3) co-reference-2
import-1.theme manufacture-1.theme
In the arborization of the TMR list, the co-reference that pertains within one sentence
will result in the latter proposition, IMPORT-1, to be suspended from the theme (as the
shared concept) of the earlier one, MANUFACTURE-1.202      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
(4) ...--purpose--import-1--|--agent--unknown
                                       |--theme--manufacture-1.theme--manufacture-1--|--agent--unknown
                                       |                                                                             |--theme--unknown
                                       |                                                                             |--location--USA
                                       |--source--Japan
                                       |--destination--USA
In short, the third principle of arborization is
3.  Propositions with co-referenced concepts that are not branches of the TMR
tree through principle 2 are branches of the concept that is first used within
the tree.
If full sentences are conjoined through coordination (￿and,￿ ￿or,￿ ￿but￿) they are
linked as two nodes under the same AUTHOR-EVENT. Similarly, if there is a temporal
relation between two sentences (￿before,￿ ￿after,￿ ￿during,￿ etc.), they are ordered in
actual event occurrence under a node indicating the temporal relation directly under
the AUTHOR-EVENT node. Modalities of events (formality, politeness, respect, etc.) are
final branches under the concept they take scope over, with the type, value, and attri-
bution as the subbranches of that branch.
If there is no ordering imposed on nodes on the same level from the meaning of the
text, we found it desirable to have ￿less important￿ ones at the bottom, where they will
be the first to be targeted by our scheme. A first proposal for a hierarchy as suggested
by the ontology browser is the following. Note, of course, that not all slots of a con-
cept are filled where this concept occurs in the TMR of a text, but if several slots are
filled, their order will follow this hierarchy: case roles >> specifically restricted slots
(not inherited) >> cause-effect >> composition >> inheritance (should be rare in
TMRs).
4.2  Accommodating the Watermark Bits
We have devised three general methods for changing the text in such a way that the
TMR tree, and consequently our reading of it and the resulting bitstring for the water-
mark, will be affected by this change.
1.  grafting: cutting/copying of information in one sentence and pasting it into an-
other
2.  pruning: cutting of information that is repeated
3.  substitution: replacement with equivalent information
In general, the information that can be used for these schemata is chosen by two
criteria. The first, most important, is that information that is repeated, established in
the TMR through co-reference, can be safely removed, or repeated again. The second
is that there is additional information available from the fact database of ontological
semantics, and this additional information can be substituted for part of or added to
the tree. We will discuss these criteria and their application in depth below. Note that
in an important sense, substantive rather than technical, we detect, manipulate, and/or
create the LSBs in natural language texts, something that they do not possess so natu-
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change the meaning of the sentences we make sure that we do it in the least significant
way possible.
4.2.1  Co-reference
In order to be coherent, every well-formed text has cohesion, that is, it is about some-
thing. This theme will be established early in the text, which then proceeds to add
more information about it. The new information will be in relation to the old informa-
tion already given, and is often explicitly established in this way. If the text we have to
watermark is, for example, about the United States bombing Afghanistan, we will
expect it to make reference throughout to the concepts ￿United States,￿ ￿Afghanistan,￿
and ￿bombing.￿ These instances of the concepts will be interrelated, because it is, for
example, always the same ￿Afghanistan￿ the text will refer to. That is, the instances
are co-referential.
In non-technical terms, for our sample text, Afghanistan is the main theme, or at
least one of the main themes. Accordingly, many sentences will be about this nation
itself or several of its slot fillers resulting in a rather extensive co-reference of ￿Af-
ghanistan.￿ The following are the established co-reference relations for the sample
text (see Appendix) with the portion of the text that contains the proposition which
instantiates ￿Afghanistan￿ on the right:
(5) co-reference-4
bomb-1.target ￿carpet-bombed Taliban front lines in Afghanistan￿
victory-1.theme  ￿With no visible victory so far in Afghanistan￿
assault-1.theme ￿The United States has been attacking Afghanistan￿
fly-air-vehicle-1.path the occurrence in the example sentence
carry-2.destination ￿fly additional ... troops into the country￿
assault-4.theme ￿U.S. strikes on Afghanistan￿
(assault-1 = assault-4)
assault-6.location ￿In Afghanistan, U.S. planes stepped up strikes￿
...
It is safe to assume that the web of co-references woven throughout a text is very
tight. To illustrate this fact, in reverse, it is very exceptional that a sentence will not
have any co-reference to its surrounding context. In a text about the United States
bombing Afghanistan, there will not be a sentence like (6).
(6) Today, coffee is the second most popular beverage in the world, after water.
For the use in our watermarking scheme, every set of co-references is given with the
full subtrees of the co-referenced concepts as they appear in each context. This way,
the meaning-manipulating operations of our system are optimally facilitated. It should
be added that co-reference detection, essential for meaning processing aside of any
IAS concerns, is very reliable.204      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
4.2.2  Fact Database
The second basic tool is the use of information available from the fact database re-
source of ontological semantics. The fact database entry for Afghanistan would yield
the following additional information, conveniently structured in a tree-like hierarchy:
(7) Afghanistan (nation-1)
borders-on China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
has-currency afghani
has-member Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek
has-representative Mullah Mohammad Omar
...
4.3  Manipulation of the TMR Tree
In general, concepts that have greater co-reference will be better candidates to be
changed. This selection principle to determine the possible cutting or pasting points of
the tree is only outranked by the following one: The lower a concept is in the TMR
tree, the less important we assume the information it represents to be. The search for a
candidate to change will thus start from the lower end of the tree and proceed until it
identifies a concept for which co-reference is established.
Through the co-reference relations computed for the whole text we know additional
slot fillers for several of the ontological concepts instantiated in the TMR of the sen-
tence to be changed. This includes, for example, MINISTRY-1 ￿Pentagon,￿ but most
prominently NATION-4 ￿Afghanistan.￿
4.3.1  Pruning of TMR Trees
In case several candidates present themselves for the manipulation based on repeated
information as witnessed by co-reference, the pruning method will prefer the one for
which more information is repeated. Although we won￿t completely lose any informa-
tion through pruning, because we know it is repeated elsewhere in the text, the as-
sumption is that it is less likely to be a salient loss in the position where we cut it, if
we have more than two uses of the concept.
In our example, co-reference tells us that NATION-4 is abundantly repeated and can
be pruned more safely than other concepts that are less often repeated, like, for exam-
ple, CITY-1, ￿Washington,￿ which occurs five times in the text. We will not clear the
first use of a concept for pruning, but any of the subsequent ones und the assumption
that the first mention is privileged. This would make the omission of NATION-5 in the
TMR trees of these and any following co-referenced instances possible: VICTORY-
1.THEME, ASSAULT-1.THEME, FLY-AIR-VEHICLE-1.PATH.
The following are the respective sentences with the words in italics cleared for
pruning:
(8) a. With no visible victory so far in Afghanistan, President Bush asserted that
the campaign he launched in reprisal for September￿s mass killings on U.S.
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b. In Pakistan, which is backing U.S. strikes on Afghanistan, a minister said
official tests confirmed that at least one suspicious letter received there
contained anthrax spores.
c. The Pentagon ordered two new spy planes, including the unmanned
￿Global Hawk￿, to the region to start flying over Afghanistan.
When a co-referenced instance of a concept has been used for any manipulation,
grafting, pruning, or substitution, it gets a flag that will prevent its repeated use in the
same cycle. Only if at a later point nothing but the use of a flagged concept could
tweak a sentence to read the desired bit, will such concepts be considered again.
4.3.2  Grafting of TMR Trees
If we decide to pursue the scheme that would add additional information for an in-
stance of a concept, our analyzer will pick one of the other instances and ￿litter￿ it
with information about it that could be gleaned from the instance of the concept￿s
mention at hand. If it would choose, for example, the third co-reference, ASSAULT-
1.THEME, the information in (9) from the TMR tree will be grafted onto the tree of
sentence (10) after it has been copied or cut from its original occurrence, resulting in
tree (11):
(9) assault-1--|--agent--nation-1--￿United States￿
                                  |--theme--nation-4--￿Afghanistan￿
(10) The Pentagon ordered two new spy planes, including the unmanned ￿Global
Hawk￿, to the region to start flying over Afghanistan.
(11) purpose--fly-air-vehicle-1--|--agent--unknown
                                                         |--path--assault-1.theme--assault-1--|--agent--nation-1--￿United States￿
                                                                                                                  |--theme--nation-4--￿Afghanistan￿
In order to keep the tree branching strictly downward the new proposition is simply
grafted onto the concept of the main tree that is co-referential to the other concept.
Since this is a reversible process, the generator of ontological semantics will be able to
generate the following new sentence out of the grafted TMR tree (11):
(12) The Pentagon ordered two new spy planes, including the unmanned ￿Global
Hawk￿, to the region to start flying over Afghanistan, which they are attack-
ing.
4.3.3  Adding/Substitution
The methods described in this section can, of course, be combined, and we can utilize
additional information ontological semantics provides through its fact database. For
the example, we find the database entry given in subsection 3.2.2 above and can glean
from it the fact that Afghanistan was at the time of writing of the text ruled by the
politician Mullah Mohammed Omar. Thus, we can add to the final node this piece of
information as in (13), or we can substitute it as in (14), yielding the sentences in (15)
and (16), respectively.
(13) assault-1--|--agent--nation-1--￿United States￿
                               |--theme--geopolitical-entity--|--has-representative--politician-6
(14) assault-1--|--agent--nation-1--￿United States￿
                               |--theme--nation-4--|--has-representative--politician-6206      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
(15) The United States are attacking the country ruled by Mullah Mohammed
Omar.
(16) The United States are attacking Afghanistan, which is ruled by Mullah Mo-
hammed Omar.
4.3.4  Summary
The three methods of TMR tree manipulation make use of the resources provided by
ontological semantics in the following way:
pruning co-reference
grafting co-reference
substitution fact database
If necessary they can be combined to more than one concept in most sentences,
namely any concept that has co-reference, accounting for the high bandwidth of this
scheme (see above).
5  Putting Large Watermarks in Short Texts
If the number of sentences n is small enough that nβ is not much larger than the num-
ber of bits (= w) in the watermark, as happens with short communiquØs or newsclips,
then we cannot afford to ￿waste￿ sentences by using them for markers. Every sentence
is needed for carrying watermark bits. In that case we do not use markers, we simply
use the first sentence s1 for the first β bits of the watermark, s2 for the next β bits of
the watermark, etc. We may even be interested in choosing a rather large β, but for a
large enough β there is then a danger that we may be unable to insert the next
β watermark bits in a particular sentence. This failure has probability (1￿2
￿β
tof occur-
ring in a sentence that we can ￿torture￿ in t different ways. While this is not a concern
if β is small or when t is large, an ambitious enough choice for β would make the
failure likely for at least some of the sentences that have a low t (even though t is ex-
ponential in the number of co-references for that sentence, that number of co-
references may be small for some sentences). One way around this is to choose a large
β anyway, but to provide a recovery mechanism in case the failure does happen.  The
mechanism is simply to sacrifice one (say, the first) of the β bits secretly said by each
sentence, i.e., to no longer use that particular bit to store a watermark bit, but rather to
use that bit as an indicator of whether that particular sentence is watermark-carrying or
not (hence a watermark-carrying sentence now effectively carries β￿1 rather than
β watermark bits, but we are now free to choose a large β). In case of failure for a
particular sentence, it is practically always possible to make the ￿indicator￿ bit 0, in
which case the remaining β￿1 bits secretly said by that sentence are ignored at water-
mark-reading time (for the watermark-carrying sentences that indicator-bit is 1). As-
suming, for the sake of an approximate quantitative discussion, the same t for all sen-
tences, the expected number of watermark bits successfully inserted is then
n(β￿1)(1￿(1￿2
￿β
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Compare the above quantity to the deterministic nβ￿ capacity that would have resulted
had we used a β￿ that is smaller than β. Such a β￿ would have had to be small enough
to practically guarantee that every sentence would be watermark-carrying. Sacrificing
n bits to enable a larger β, in the manner described above, is a better design than get-
ting stuck with a low β￿ whose value is determined by the ￿weakest￿ sentence (the one
with smallest t), especially since most sentences will have a substantially higher t (and
therefore higher watermark-carrying capacity) than the weakest sentence. Of course
the ￿long watermark in a short text￿ framework of this section results in a watermark
that is less resilient than in the ￿short watermark in a long text￿ case when we could
afford the luxury of markers.
The above way of avoiding markers may be attractive even in the ￿short watermark in
a long text￿ case. We could simply repeat the watermark, effectively using a longer
watermark of length n that consists of repetitions of the watermark string as many
times as needed to use all of the sentences. But the attacker who knows we are doing
this then immediately knows there is a periodicity involved and may be able to selec-
tively damage everywhere the same fragment of the watermark (the fragment he dis-
likes) without damaging its other fragments. Another drawback is that an attack that
consists of changing the order of some sentences now becomes effective, whereas it
had a low probability of success when markers were used. (The probabilities of suc-
cess of various attacks are, for the version of our scheme that uses markers, the same
as in [1], although an attacker must now change the TMR, a more tricky proposition
for her than modifying the syntax tree.)
The main other advantages of the scheme presented in this section are that:
•  Watermark-carrying capacity of a sentence is much improved, because a typical
sentence involves many co-references and the number of possible ways we can
￿torture￿ a sentence (to make it secretly say what we want) is exponential in the
number of co-references for that sentence. Specifically, if ρ is the number of co-
references and we are using t modification mechanisms then the number of ways
is t
ρ. Contrast this with the t possibilities we could play with in the syntactic ap-
proach: no exponent in that approach, the number of ways was simply t (see [1]).
•  Watermark-carrying capacity of the whole text is liberated from the straightjacket
of ￿weakest sentence determines bits of watermark per sentence.￿ This is
achieved through a choice of watermark bits per sentence (a number we call β)
that is so high that many of the weaker sentences will fail to accommodate the β
bits, in which case we ￿bypass￿ them by sacrificing one watermark bit and using
it as an ￿indicator￿ of whether the sentence is watermark-carrying or not (the
weaker sentences will not￿but they no longer force upon us a low β
•  The scheme deals with collusion tolerance by providing a mechanism for creating
deliberate noise in the text; however, that as well as the interesting topic of error
correction and post-attack restoration are subjects for future research.208      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
6  Tamperproofing
Our scheme of meaning-based text marking and manipulation lends itself not only to
watermarking, but also to tamperproofing. As stated earlier, here we use ￿tamper-
proofing￿ in the sense of ￿making tamper-evident,￿ i. e., any tampering with the text
can be inferred from the corrupted text itself (without the use of any other outside
information). The problem of tamperproofing text is easier if one considers trivial
formatting modifications (such as reformatting the text, like inserting new line breaks
or blank spaces in it) as tampering to be detected, than when one is supposed to be
forgiving of such changes, as we indeed are. The reason the former is easy is because
one can then compute some kind of keyed hash of a format-independent version of the
text, and hide that hash value in the formatting information￿any change to either the
text or the formatting would be detectable because they would no longer be ￿tuned￿ to
each other. Here we consider the harder version of the problem, where trivial format-
ting changes are not considered to be tampering, and in fact they are specifically al-
lowed because different people in the organization use different word processors, etc.
It is hard because we run into a circularity problem: by embedding the hash in the text
as a watermark, we change the text, so that it is inevitably no longer represented by
that hash. Consequently, it is not tamperproof, because a change of the text by an
attacker is in principle indistinguishable from the change resulting from the embed-
ding. Note also that we reject, as many researchers do, making the hash obvious:
among other things, it is rejected in business models as the visible expression of dis-
trust. Making the hash obvious would, of course, make our and most other tamper-
proofing proposals redundant.
One straightforward way to use our marking scheme for tamperproofing, is to sim-
ply manipulate the text so that every sentence says the same secret bitstring (e.g., β
zeroes for some small β). While easily achievable with our marking method, this
scheme has two major drawbacks: it is impervious to the deletion of whole sentences,
as the remainder will still appear tamperproof; and a modification of a sentence has a
2
￿β probability of succeeding in being undetected. In the design we give below, the
probability that removing or modifying a sentence goes undetected is 2
￿β(n+1). Here β
is chosen to be fairly small, so we are practically certain of being able to put
β watermark bits in a sentence (even β=2  is fine, as the probability of an undetected
modification of a sentence is then 2
￿2(n+1), which is one in a million even in a nine-
sentence text).
As mentioned earlier, we make two passes over the sentences. The first pass ex-
amines the sentences in the same secret ordering of them that we described earlier.
The second pass examines them in the reverse order of the first. To avoid cumbersome
notation, we assume in what follows that we have re-numbered the sentences accord-
ing to their secret ordering, so that si is the ith sentence according to the secret order-
ing and Ti is the representation of its associated tree (a TMR tree in the first pass, a
syntax tree in the second pass). Note also that this takes care of the risk of last-
sentence tampering.
Implementation note: In what follows, when we refer to semantic or syntactic water-
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in the syntactic scheme a syntax tree Ti￿s leaves now do contain the exact words asso-
ciated with these leaves, so that synonym substitution is detected.
First pass: The first pass is a semantic marking scheme. We need to state precisely
which β bits are to be the inserted as a ￿mini-watermark￿ in each sentence. Let H
denote a keyed hash function. We do the following:
We compute x1 = Hk (1￿1) = the keyed hash of all 1s (e.g., 100 ones).
We insert (as watermark) in s1 the leftmost β bits of x1.
Then for i = 2, ￿ , n we do the following:
We compute xi = Hk (xi￿1 , Ti￿1)
where xi￿1 , Ti￿1 denotes the concatenation of xi￿1 and Ti￿1, and Ti￿1 is the TMR tree
obtained from the already marked version of sentence si￿1.
We insert (as watermark) in si the leftmost β bits of the just-computed xi.
The verification phase that corresponds to the first pass is a similar pass, except
that instead of inserting β watermark bits in an si we instead read them and compare
them to the leftmost β bits of xi. Because of the ￿forward chaining￿ from 1 to n, the
probability that a modification of si goes undetected by this ￿first pass verification￿ is
2
￿β(n￿I+1).
Second pass: The second pass is a syntactic marking scheme (so it does not change
any of the TMRs resulting from the first pass). We need to state precisely which β bits
are to be the inserted as a ￿mini-watermark￿ in each sentence. As before, Hk denotes a
keyed hash function. We do the following:
We compute xn = Hk (1￿1) = the keyed hash of all 1s (e.g., 100 ones).
We insert (as watermark) in sn the leftmost β bits of xn.
Then for i = n￿1, ￿ , 1 we do the following:
We compute xi = Hk (xi+1 , Ti+1).
where xi+1 , Ti+1 denotes the concatenation of xi+1 and Ti+1, and Ti+1 is the syntax
tree obtained from the already marked version of sentence si+1.
We insert (as watermark) in si the leftmost β bits of the just-computed xi.
The verification phase that corresponds to the second pass is a similar pass, except
that instead of inserting β watermark bits in an si we instead read them and compare
them to the leftmost β bits of xi. Because of the ￿backward chaining￿ from n to 1, the
probability that a modification of si goes undetected by this ￿second pass verification￿
is
2
￿β￿ .
The probability that a modification to si escapes detection by both the first-pass verifi-
cation and the second-pass verification is therefore:
2
￿β(n￿i+1) 2
￿β￿ = 2
￿β(n+1)
which is as we claimed it to be.210      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
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Appendix: Sample Text
U.S. Carpet-Bombs Taliban; Western Bridges Guarded / Last Updated: November 02,
2001 03:51 PM ET
By Alan Elsner and Mike Collett-White
WASHINGTON/RABAT, Afghanistan (Reuters) - The United States on Friday car-
pet-bombed Taliban front lines in Afghanistan and dispatched two new spy planes to
pinpoint targets, while at home troops guarded California bridges against new terror
attacks. // The anthrax scare spread abroad. One letter in Pakistan was confirmed to
contain spores of the deadly bacteria but initial fears that the germ warfare weapon
had also spread to Germany appeared to be a false alarm. // "We’re slowly but surely
tightening the net on the enemy. We’re making it harder for the enemy to communi-
cate. We’re making it harder for the enemy to protect themselves. We’re making it
harder for the enemy to hide. And we’re going to get him and them," Bush said. // The
United States has been attacking Afghanistan for almost four weeks to root out the
ruling Islamic fundamentalist Taliban and their "guest", Saudi-born militant Osama
bin Laden, whom Washington accuses of masterminding the Sept. 11 attacks on New
York and Washington that killed almost 4,800 people. // The Pentagon ordered two
new spy planes, including the unmanned "Global Hawk", to the region to start flying
over Afghanistan. // But Navy Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem said freezing rain was
hampering efforts to fly additional elite U.S. special forces troops into the country to
join the handful already there.
The United States added 22 groups including Hamas and Hizbollah, which have taken
responsibility for suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, to the list of "terrorist"
groups under tight financial controls introduced after Sept. 11. // Americans were on
top alert on Friday, after warnings of new terror attacks in the coming week, and Cali-
fornia beefed up security around several bridges, including San Francisco’s landmark
Golden Gate Bridge in the light of what it called credible threats of a rush hour attack
on November 2.
[...]
ATTACKS "SPOT ON"
An opposition commander, Mustafah, watched from his roof near the front as B-52s
unleashed their second day of carpet-bombing this week. He said he saw flames and
smoke rise from positions used by the Taliban to shell the opposition-held Bagram air
base. // "These attacks are spot on," another opposition commander, Rellozai, said
from a rooftop vantage point. // Washington’s strategy has focused on promoting a
broad-based alliance incorporating the Northern Alliance, the majority Pashtun, from
which the Taliban draw their support, and other ethnic groups across the impoverished
country. // The effort suffered a blow last week when the Taliban captured and exe-
cuted one prominent Afghan opposition leader, Abdul Haq, who had sneaked into the
country to organize resistance to the Taliban. // In southern Afghanistan, Taliban
fighters chased Hamid Karzai, a supporter of ex-King Zahir Shahon, on a mission to
rally opposition to the Muslim militia. The former minister fled to the hills after his
base was overrun.212      Mikhail J Atallah et al.
Hamid’s brother, Ahmed Karzai, said Hamid was fine. He said his brother had been
holding a meeting with tribal leaders when he was attacked. // The brother said Hamid
had more than 100 fighters with him on his mission that he said was trying to find
support for a broad-based government to be formed after a Loya Jirga, or grand coun-
cil, of Afghans in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. // The Taliban, who have imposed their
own strict interpretation of Islam on Afghanistan, say 1,500 people have been killed
since the U.S.-led air campaign began. There is no independent confirmation of the
figure, which Washington says is grossly exaggerated.
LEADERS SAFE
The Taliban consul in Karachi said on Friday that the movement’s leader, Mullah
Mohammad Omar, as well as bin Laden were safe. // Moulvi Rahamatullah Kakazada
told Qatar’s al-Jazeera television that "thank God all brothers inside are protected from
any harm especially the prince of believers (Mullah Omar) and Sheikh Osama bin
Laden."
The governor of the war-battered city of Kandahar, where rubble from flattened
houses litters the streets, said the Taliban movement would survive even if U.S. forces
killed Mullah Omar. // "We are Muslims, we are an organization. These things do
happen, but one person can be replaced by others," he said.
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